Germany · 2017
CDC claims over €369 million from Germany’s three main sugar producers on behalf of more than 1,000 retailers and food manufacturers. The case is now at the evidence stage before the Higher Regional Court of Celle.
On 18 February 2014, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) imposed fines totalling around €280 million on the sugar manufacturers Nordzucker AG, Pfeifer & Langen GmbH & Co. KG and Südzucker AG for their involvement in anti-competitive agreements concerning sales territories, customers and prices on the German sugar market. This cartel concerned both sugar for the processing industry (industrial sugar) and sugar for the food retail sector (household sugar).
According to the FCO, from the mid-1990s until the FCO’s investigations in spring 2009, the cartel members operated a long-standing market and customer-sharing agreement covering the whole of Germany. Their “customer and volume management” was aimed at refraining from mutual competition and exporting surplus volumes of quota sugar rather than offering them to potential customers in Germany. Furthermore, the cartel members coordinated their activities with regard to the EU Sugar Market Regulation, the EU’s eastward enlargement and changes in import and export flows. Their aim was to uphold the “home market rule” and to “respect” the allocation ofcore sales territories in order to achieve the highest possible prices for sugar. According to the FCO, this worked “well”.
As the FCO has clarified, these practices were not a consequence of the regulation of the European sugar markets. Despite the quota system and minimum price guarantees, competition for sales territories, customers and prices would have been possible. Instead, however, the cartel members exploited the European quota system, the minimum price system and the resulting high market transparency for their coordination, and restricted the remaining competition. The case thus demonstrates how comprehensive market regulation can contribute to restricting competition to the detriment of customers.
The sugar manufacturers did not appeal against the FCO’s decision. Its findings are therefore binding on the civil courts in proceedings for damages.
On 16 February 2017, CDC filed a claim for damages against the three cartel members at the Regional Court of Hanover. CDC is asserting claims for damages acquired from over 1,000 retailers and food and beverage manufacturers who, as direct or indirect purchasers of sugar and sugar substitutes in Germany during the cartel period, were affected by the anti-competitive agreements and practices.
Together with renowned external experts, CDC has carried out a comprehensive economic assessment of the damage caused by the cartel. In doing so, the specific characteristics of the sugar market, such as the EU Sugar Regulation, were taken into account. Given that the cartel had an impact on several market levels, the assessment comprises a combined horizontal and vertical economic damage analysis.
Accordingly, both direct and indirect customers of the sugar manufacturers were significantly overcharged for their purchases of industrial sugar, household sugar and substitute products during the cartel period – and beyond, due to after-effects. By the end of 2025, the total damages claimed by CDC, including interest, amount to over €369 million.
In 2021, the Regional Court dismissed CDC’s action at first instance on the grounds that, under the German Legal Services Act, there were fundamental concerns regarding the collective enforcement of assigned claims for damages arising from breaches of competition law. CDC, represented by lawyers from Willkie Farr & Gallagher, has lodged an appeal against this decision with the Higher Regional Court of Celle. The Higher Regional Court has since indicated that it does not share the Regional Court’s legal view – in line with the recent case law of the German Supreme Court, which has recognised the pooling of claims in antitrust cases such as this as permissible.
The proceedings are currently at the stage of taking evidence regarding the damages to be awarded. The Higher Regional Court has appointed an economic expert for this purpose. CDC, for its part, is being supported by the economic experts at Solve.
In fact, other claimants have also filed numerous claims for damages due to the sugar cartel before various German courts; in some cases, the sugar manufacturers have even already been ordered to pay damages, albeit only small amounts. The CDC case could become the first – and by far the most significant – case in which an appeal court awards substantial damages in relation to that cartel.
Netherlands · 2017
CDC bundles claims for around 90,000 trucks against the manufacturers behind a 14-year EEA-wide price cartel. In April 2026 the Amsterdam court set the overcharge at 7%, the first Dutch trucks case to reach the damages phase.
On 19 July 2016, the European Commission fined five truck manufacturers: MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco, and DAF, a record €2.93 billion for cartel conduct that lasted more than 14 years (1997–2011) and covered the entire European Economic Area. The infringement involved coordinating gross list prices for medium (6–16 tonnes) and heavy (over 16 tonnes) trucks, aligning the timing of new emission technologies, and passing the cost of those technologies on to customers. The five undertakings settled with the Commission and admitted the infringement; no action for annulment was brought. On 27 September 2017, the Commission imposed a further €880 million fine on Scania for the same cartel, bringing the total to roughly €3.81 billion.
In its judgment of 1 August 2022 in case C-588/20, Daimler, the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that the cartel covered all medium and heavy trucks (rigid trucks and tractor units alike, with all standard and special equipment and factory-fitted options) excluding only trucks for military use. In line with consistent CJEU case law, any company that bought, leased, or rented trucks during the cartel period is entitled to compensation.
CDC filed its first action (CDC I) before the Amsterdam District Court on 13 July 2017, bundling the claims of more than 700 companies across Europe (large corporates and SMEs alike) for around 60,000 trucks. In June 2020, CDC filed a second action (CDC II) on behalf of approximately 400 transport and logistics companies for a further 30,000 trucks; CDC II is directed against the same defendants and additionally against Scania, which was not a defendant in CDC I but intervened actively throughout those proceedings.
CDC’s case is built on around 300,000 supporting documents, substantiated truck by truck. The economic analysis is led by external experts Prof. Joseph Harrington (Wharton), Prof. Maarten Pieter Schinkel, and Leo Huberts (University of Amsterdam). Professors Harrington and Schinkel’s «theory of harm» has been accepted by the Amsterdam Court and has been widely followed and cited by courts across Europe. The econometric quantification is performed by Schinkel and Huberts, whose EU-wide methodology has now been endorsed by the Amsterdam Court.
CDC is represented by the law firm AKD, with partners Nikee Groot and Jeffrey Kleywegt.
The quality of that preparation is acknowledged on all sides. CDC has documented 99.7% of the trucks in CDC I to a high evidentiary standard; the comparable figure across other Dutch claimants is below 10%. That gap is the reason the Court separated CDC I from the broader group of cases and put it on an accelerated track, making it the first, and so far only, Dutch trucks case to reach the damages phase. Counsel for one of the defendants, the law firm Stibbe, observed in commenting on the 15 April 2026 judgment that “CDC had substantiated its claims much better than other claimants, amongst others by submitting several extensive expert reports and detailed information and documentation on a per truck basis, the CDC-I proceedings were separated from the first group of joined cases. As such, the CDC-I proceedings were expedited and follow a distinct and accelerated timeline from the other Dutch trucks cases.”, a frank acknowledgment from the other side of the courtroom of the rigour the case has required.
CDC has reached settlements with several of the defendants across both proceedings and continues the litigation against the others, remaining the locomotive of the Dutch trucks litigation and continuing to advance the state of the legal debate.
A series of favourable interim judgments has shaped the Dutch trucks litigation:
15 May 2019 — the Amsterdam District Court confirmed the merits of CDC’s claims, endorsed the single and continuous infringement argument, validated the bundling of claims by assignment, and made clear that specialist claim vehicles are not subject to a higher burden of proof than any other harmed party.
12 May 2021 — the Court confirmed the binding effect of the entire Commission decision, the scope and nature of the cartel, and the likelihood of damage. It accepted that defendants cannot, in damages proceedings, contest facts they admitted in the settlement procedure, and recognised that a cartel can have post-cartel («lingering») effects. Substantial portions of the reasoning of Professors Harrington and Schinkel were incorporated into the judgment; those passages, and the Court’s endorsement of them, have since been widely relied upon by other courts across Europe.
27 July 2022 — the Court confirmed (again) CDC’s standing as a litigation vehicle, the validity of CDC’s assignment agreements (rejecting objections based on German Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz and English Champerty and Maintenance), and the uniform application of Dutch law to all assigned claims, regardless of the member state in which the trucks were purchased.
15 April 2026 — in its most detailed interim judgment to date, the Court ruled that the cartel caused a price overcharge of 7%, endorsed the methodology and data of Schinkel and Huberts, and rejected the defendants’ more fragmented brand-by-country modelling. It addressed the problems with the defendants’ internal cost series, citing the English Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Norwegian Borgarting Court of Appeal on endogeneity and lack of transparency, and set the end of the post-cartel run-off ( = lingering effects) period at 30 May 2013. The Court decided virtually all questions on volume of commerce and value of commerce in CDC’s favour including confirming that vehicle registrations and national road-authority data can substitute for missing invoices and that the prices and leasing instalments paid by CDC’s assignors are the correct basis for damage calculation. The Court did not follow CDC on damages from the delayed introduction of new emission technologies, and it signalled that the passing-on debate will need to continue.
Spain · 2023
CDC pursues over €47 million in damages for more than 14,000 car buyers harmed by information-sharing among 21 manufacturers. The case is pending before the Commercial Court of Valladolid.
On 23 July 2015, the Spanish Competition Authority, the ‘Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia’ (‘CNMC’) fined 21 car manufacturers and two consulting agencies operating in Spain EUR 171 million for breaches of competition law between February 2006 and August 2013, the highest fine in CNMC´s history (Exp. S/0482/13 Fabricantes de Automóviles).
The fined companies, covering more than 90% of the Spanish market, exchanged commercially sensitive information on car sales. By doing so, they were able to control the vast majority of the distribution and after-sales market in Spain allowing them to establish commercial conditions detrimental to their customers. Among other things, this resulted in both consumers and companies paying higher prices for cars due to the illegal conduct of the car manufacturers. Preliminary price overcharge estimations are in the range of 10-15%.
The fined entities are: AUTOMÓVILES CITROËN ESPAÑA, B&M AUTOMÓVILES ESPAÑA, BMW IBÉRICA, S.A.U., CHEVROLET ESPAÑA, S.A.U., CHRYSLER ESPAÑA, S.L., FIAT GROUP AUTOMOBILES SPAIN, S.A., FORD ESPAÑA, S.L., GENERAL MOTORS ESPAÑA, S.L.U., HONDA MOTOR EUROPE LIMITED, BRANCH IN SPAIN, S.L., HYUNDAI MOTOR ESPAÑA, S.L.U., KIA MOTORS IBERIA, S.L., MAZDA AUTOMÓVILES ESPAÑA, S.A., MERCEDES BENZ ESPAÑA, S.A., NISSAN IBERIA, S.A., PEUGEOT ESPAÑA, S.A., PORSCHE IBÉRICA, S.A., RENAULT ESPAÑA COMERCIAL, S.A., SEAT, S.A., SNAP-ON BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, S.L., TOYOTA ESPAÑA, S.L., URBAN SCIENCE ESPAÑA, S.L.U., VOLKSWAGEN AUDI ESPAÑA, S.A. and VOLVO CAR ESPAÑA, S.A.. SEAT, S.A. as well as the other companies forming part of the Group to which it belongs (VOLKSWAGEN AUDI ESPAÑA, S.A. and PORSCHE IBÉRICA, S.A.), met the requirements set out in article 65 of the LDC and, consequently, were exempted from paying the fine relating to their participation in the infringing conduct.
CDC has purchased and acquired damage claims from over 14,000 assignors, mainly consumers, that were affected by the anticompetitive agreements and practices as purchasers of cars in Spain during the cartel period.
With its action filed in November 2023, CDC is asserting these claims for damages against RENAULT ESPAÑA COMERCIAL, S.A., FIAT CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILES SPAIN, S.A., STELLANTIS ESPAÑA, S.L. and STELLANTIS, N.V. as joint and several debtors. The case is currently pending in first instance before the Commercial Court of Valladolid. The total damages claimed by CDC, including interest, exceed EUR 47 million.
Spain · 2015 (CNMC decision)
The CNMC found a hardcore cartel across the pulp and corrugated board markets, running from 2002 to 2013. CDC is preparing to enforce the claims of over 150 companies that bought cardboard boxes during that period.
On June 18, 2015, the Spanish Competition Authority (CNMC) issued a decision imposing administrative fines totaling EUR 57,686,187 on 18 companies (manufacturers of paper, corrugated cardboard and cardboard packaging) and a trade association for engaging in a single, continuous infringement of competition law within the pulp and corrugated board manufacturing and transformation markets in Spain. Although the Spanish National Court annulled the CNMC’s decision sanctioning the Cardboard Cartel in 2018, this annulment was due to formal reasons (a delay in the adoption of the administrative decision). The Court did not, at any point, question the facts established or the substantive conclusions reached by the CNMC in its decision.
According to the CNMC’s decision, anti-competitive practices in the Spanish paper manufacturing, paper, and cardboard markets constituted a single, continuous infringement across several market levels:
The CNMC classified this infringement as a hardcore cartel.
Purchasers of corrugated cardboard (boxes) affected by the cartel are entitled, under Spanish and EU law, to claim full compensation from cartel members for damages resulting from the anti-competitive practices established by the CNMC. These claims for damages would also include accrued interest from the time the damage was incurred.
In collaboration with its partners, CDC is currently preparing to enforce damage claims on behalf of over 150 companies that purchased corrugated cardboard boxes during the affected periods. These companies benefit not only from CDC’s over 20 years of experience and expertise in Europe-wide antitrust claim enforcement but also from CDC’s full assumption of all costs and risks. CDC’s “bundling model” enables the comprehensive collection of data, facilitating the preparation of robust damage analysis and the strongest possible presentation of evidence in court. The model also enhances negotiating power against cartel members and ensures complete alignment of interest between the affected companies and CDC.
Italy · 2025
Together with BE CAUSE, CDC brought a single action before the Court of Milan for more than 100 companies overcharged by two cartels between 2004 and 2017. CDC handles bookbuilding, data and case operations.
In Italy, for about 14 years from February 2004 until March 2017, as many as 34 producers of corrugated cardboard sheets and corrugated cardboard packaging colluded to charge inflated prices, imposing higher prices on purchasing companies than they would have been able to obtain under free competition.
The unlawful cartels were identified and sanctioned by the AGCM – Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italian Competition Authority), which, on 17 July 2019, proved the existence of two price-fixing agreements, concerning the sale and marketing of corrugated cardboard sheets and corrugated cardboard packaging, respectively.
First the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) and then the Council of State fully confirmed the existence of the cartels, paving the way for compensation actions by thousands of victim companies that purchased corrugated cardboard sheets and packaging in the period 2004-2017.
Anyone who purchased corrugated cardboard between 2004 and 2017 is entitled to claim damages for the higher price paid as a result of the unlawful cartels of corrugated cardboard sheets and packaging.
The AGCM’s decision, confirmed by the administrative justice bodies, is binding for the Italian competent court Tribunale delle Imprese and renders the existence of the cartels, the nature of the infringement and the presumption of harm to purchasers indisputable.
The anti-competitive cartels led to an unfair and significant overcharge, to which must be added interest accruing from the date of the individual purchases until the payment of damages.
The total compensation is then to be determined as the sum of the net overcharge plus interest.
BE CAUSE, the first and only Alternative Investment Fund in the litigation finance sector in Italy, and CDC joined forces to take antitrust action against the Italian corrugated cardboard cartels, without costs and risks for participants.
BE CAUSE and CDC proposed that those harmed by cartels exercise their right to compensation through a single legal action, brought by BE CAUSE in its own name in the interest of all harmed parties.
This is an original solution which presents all the advantages of a collective action with funding of litigation costs and at the same time reduces the duration and procedural risks.
CDC carried out operational tasks, including bookbuilding activities, the preparation and management of contractual documentation, serving as the point of contact with the participating companies, and the collection, organisation, and cleaning of relevant data. CDC also supported the economists and legal teams by assisting with data analysis and the preparation of materials required for the economic assessments and legal proceedings.
In October 2025, BE CAUSE filed a legal action for damages before the Court of Milan in Italy, by pursuing claims from more than 100 companies purchasing corrugated cardboard packaging.
For further information, please visit the case website www.risarcimentocartoneondulato.it.
Spain · 2019 (CNMC decision)
Ten major dairy companies colluded for over a decade to push raw milk prices below competitive levels. CDC is preparing a bundled claim for the dairy farmers who were paid less.
On 11 July 2019, the Spanish Competition Authority, the ‘Comisión Nacional de Mercados y Competencia’ (‘CNMC’) fined ten large dairy companies operating in Spain €80 million for breaches of competition law between the years 2000 and 2013 (Expte. S/0425/12 INDUSTRIAS LÁCTEAS 2).
CDC is currently preparing the bundled enforcement of damage claims to which the dairy farmers harmed by the milk cartel are entitled (more on this below).
According to the CNMC’s findings, the main purchasers of raw cow’s milk exchanged information on purchase prices, purchase quantities and milk surpluses since 2000. This enabled them to coordinate trading strategies, restrict competition in the market for the supply of unprocessed cow’s milk and prevent farmers from obtaining competitive market prices for their raw milk. As a result, they prevented dairy farmers from negotiating prices and gave them the choice of either selling their milk at lower prices or not being able to sell some of it at all. According to the CNMC, this way the cartel members managed to force prices below competitive levels.
The companies involved in the milk cartel are Calidad Pascual, S.A. (formerly Grupo Leche Pascual, S.A.), Central Lechera de Galicia (CELEGA, S.L.), Corporación Alimentaria Peñasanta, S.A. , Danone, S.A. , Grupo Lactalis Iberia, S.A. , Nestlé España, S.A. , Industrias Lácteas de Granada, S.L.U. (formerly PULEVA FOOD, S.L.), Schreiber Food España, S.L. (formerly SENOBLE IBERICA, S.L.), Association of Galician Dairy Companies, Guild of the Catalan Dairy Industry, Industrias Lácteas Asturianas, S.A. , Grupo Leche Río, S.A. , Feiraco Lácteos, S.L. , Leche Celta, S.L. , Forlactaria Operadores Lecheros, S.A., Coop. Agrícola y Ganadera Del Pireneo SCCL and Central Lechera Asturiana, S.A.T., and the cartelists’ subsidiaries during the cartel period.
Dairy farmers affected by the cartel are entitled under Spanish and EU-law to claim full compensation from the cartel members for the damage caused by the anti-competitive practices established by the CNMC. Any claim for damages would also include accrued interest from the time the damage occurred. In its decision, the CNMC estimates that the anti-competitive practices of the dairy companies resulted in an artificial price decrease of more than 10%. According to this, each dairy farmer could claim at least 10% of his turnover during the cartel period plus accrued interest. However, how much damage was suffered in each individual case can only be quantified after a comprehensive economic damage analysis has been carried out.
Together with its cooperation partners, CDC is currently preparing to enforce the claims for damages of a large number of dairy farmers. The dairy farmers are not only benefiting from CDC’s almost 20 years of experience and expertise in the field of Europe-wide enforcement of antitrust claims for damages, but also from CDC’s full assumption of all costs and risks. The advantages of comprehensive data collection associated with the “bundling model” developed by CDC also enables the preparation of a robust damage analysis as well as the best possible presentation of evidence in the event of court proceedings. The synergy effects and stronger negotiating power vis-à-vis the cartel members achieved through the bundling of claims round off the complete alignment of interests between the harmed dairy farmers on the one hand and CDC on the other.
Yes! CDC is in principle open to including the claims of additional dairy farmers in its bundled claims enforcement. If you are interested in more detailed information on this, simply contact us. We will be happy to personally explain our approach and all the associated benefits to you.
Netherlands · 2026
Backed by HOTREC, the Hotel Claims Alliance seeks compensation for hotels across Europe harmed by Booking’s parity clauses. CDC manages the case, filed before the Amsterdam District Court with no cost risk for hotels.
Hotels across Europe are joining forces to claim compensation from Booking.com (Booking) for years of anti-competitive practices. The initiative is supported by HOTREC (the umbrella association of national hotel associations in Europe) and managed by CDC Cartel Damage Claims, which is responsible for the overall case management and strategic oversight of the entire initiative.
Since 2004, Booking has imposed “wide” parity clauses on its partner hotels, preventing them from offering lower prices or better conditions on any other distribution channel, including their own websites. Although these clauses were partially reduced in 2015 to so-called “narrow” parity clauses, allowing lower prices or better conditions only on other online travel agencies (OTAs), but still prohibiting them on hotels’ own websites, the anti-competitive effect remained significant.
Parity clauses artificially inflated Booking’s commission levels, hindered the growth of more efficient direct booking channels, and restricted competition in the OTA market, contributing to increasing market concentration.
Regulatory and judicial bodies across Europe have condemned these practices:
Following this binding judgment, hotels across the EU, EEA and Switzerland are entitled to claim damages directly under EU primary law (in addition to the hotels’ respective national laws).
Hotels suffered substantial financial harm due to Booking’s illegal practices. These damages include:
Damages cover both actual financial losses (damnum emergens) and lost profits (lucrum cessans). Economic analyses, including reports produced by Booking itself, suggest that OTA commission rates could have fallen below 5% in the absence of parity clauses. The impact on hotels’ margins and business strategies has been significant. It is reasonable to estimate that hotels have paid an overcharge of at least 30% due to Booking’s practices. This represents the approximate amount they may be entitled to recover, in addition to legal interest.
To streamline and strengthen enforcement, the Hotel Claims Alliance, a Dutch foundation (Stichting), has been established. The Stichting will:
Hotels assign their claims to the Stichting, which enforces them in its own name and at its own risk. This structure allows hotels to participate without becoming a party to the legal proceedings themselves.
The action was filed on 29th January 2026 before the Amsterdam District Court, for three main reasons:
All legal, economic and procedural costs of the initiative are fully covered by a professional third-party litigation fund. Hotels incur no upfront cost and assume no financial risk in Stichting’s action. In case of success, they will share a portion of the recovered amount with the funder.
The case brings together some of Europe’s leading competition experts:
This collective action offers a unique opportunity for hotels across Europe to obtain fair compensation for the long-standing harm caused by Booking’s unlawful practices. Supported by clear legal precedent and led by top-tier legal, economic, and industry experts, the initiative provides a powerful and efficient mechanism for affected hotels to assert their rights, at no cost risk. Participating hotels can rely on a robust, well-structured enforcement process. Whether through settlement or litigation, the objective remains the same: to secure full compensation for the damage suffered and to uphold the principle that no company is above the rules of fair competition. More information can be found on mybookingclaim.com.
Portugal · 2020
CDC supports Ius Omnibus in a collective action seeking over €400 million for all Portuguese consumers. It follows the European Commission’s 2019 fine for Mastercard’s cross-border acquiring rules.
In 2019, Mastercard was fined over €570 million for implementing commercial rules which restricted competition in the EEA market for the acquiring of card payment transactions.
Mastercard maintained a set of cross-border acquiring rules, which created an obstacle to cross-border trade in acquiring services within the EEA. Cross-border acquiring takes place when the merchant’s bank (‘the acquirer’) is in a different country than the merchant. According to Mastercard rules, a card payment transaction that has been cleared and settled gives rise to an ‘interchange fee’ to be paid by the acquirer to the cardholder’s bank (‘the issuer’). Mastercard rules stipulated that, unless the acquirer had agreed bilaterally with the issuer on the interchange fee, a cross-border acquirer was obliged to apply a domestic MIF set by Mastercard and applicable at the country of the merchants.
Mastercard’s cross-border acquiring rules meant that acquirers offering services in Member States where the domestic MIF were lower were prevented from offering cheaper services based on the MIFs in their ‘home’ countries to merchants based in other Member States where the domestic MIFs were higher. The merchants were also prevented from taking advantage of the internal market and of benefitting from less expensive services from card acquirers established in Member States where MIF were lower. Therefore, Mastercard’s cross-border acquiring rules created an obstacle to cross-border trade in the market for acquiring card payment transactions within the EEA.
CDC is assisting the Portuguese consumer protection association Ius Omnibus in their collective action. Ius Omnibus represents all consumers in Portugal, irrespective of whether they were Mastercard users.
A consumer claim was filed on 2 December 2020 at the Portuguese Competition, Regulation and Supervision Court by Ius Omnibus, aimed at compensating all Portuguese consumers who were injured by Mastercard’s anticompetitive practices. Ius Omnibus is seeking damages of more than 400 million Euros in total.
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