Budapest, Hungary – Martin Seegers
Martin Seegers participated in a panel on competition damages actions against digital platforms. He discussed trends and recent developments across EU. Date: October 08, 2026Time: 18:40 pm CET; Pullmann Hotel Budepast, Rooftop Hall, Budapest, Hungary
Greece – Till Schreiber
Till Schreiber spoke at 20th International Conference on Competition and Regulation (CRESSE 2026), taking place at the Neptune Luxury Resort on Kos Island, Greece, from 3–5 July 2026. Till joined Special Policy Session 4: “20 Years of Private Damages Action in the EU”, contributing to a distinguished panel discussion on the evolution of private antitrust damages actions in Europe, the key achievements over the past two decades, and the challenges that lie ahead. Fellow panelists include Kai Brauneisen, John Davies, Hans Friederszick, Thomas Ross, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, and Frode Steen. Date: July 3-5, 2026
Joint and several liability of cartelists under Spanish law: before and after the EU Damages Directive
Introduction: the classical problem of multiple attribution in antitrust damages The litigation arising from the truck manufacturers cartel has forced Spanish courts to confront one of the most complex issues in competition damages law: how to structure liability when harm is caused by a plurality of infringers acting in a coordinated manner over extended periods of time. In this context, joint and several liability is not a merely technical issue, but the point of equilibrium between two potentially competing demands: In the Spanish practice, the trucks cartel has served as a judicial framework for observing the transition from a fragmented and uncertain pre-existing system to a harmonised model driven by Directive – 2014/104 on actions for damages under national law for infringements of competition law (hereinafter, the “Damages Directive”). In comparative perspective, joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors has long been a structural feature of European private law, reflected for instance in the Principles of European Tort Law (Art 9:101 PETL) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Art VI – 6:105 DCFR). This also broadly applies to cartel damages claims across national legal systems. The distinctive contribution of the Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages, namely its Article 11 (“joint and several liability”), therefore lies not in introducing joint and several liability as such, but in clarifying its scope and structuring its limitations, particularly in relation to immunity and leniency recipients (see also COM (2013) 404 final, section 4.3.3). The pre-Directive framework: conceptual uncertainty and fragmented solutions In fact, however, the legal situation in Spain was by no means entirely clear prior to the transposition of Directive 2014/104/EU into national law (Real Decreto-ley 9/2017). At that time, the regime governing civil liability for competition infringements was still based primarily on domestic foundations: the Civil Code and a still-developing body of case law on antitrust damages. Accordingly, joint and several liability was not presumed. Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides that joint and several obligations only arise where the law or the contract expressly provides for them. In the context of multiple tortfeasors such as in cartels, this created an evident difficulty: competition infringements were not accompanied by any specific statutory rule establishing joint and several liability among infringers. As a result, pre-Directive case law oscillated between two approaches: The structural problem: the impossibility of individualising harm The core difficulty was both technical and economic: in a secret and long-lasting cartel, it is virtually impossible to determine which portion of the overcharge is attributable to each infringer. Without a clear rule of joint and several liability, the risk was twofold: This structural tension explains why pre-Directive judicial practice tended to rely on pragmatic rather than systematically coherent solutions. The Damages Directive: codifying joint and several liability as a structural rule Directive 2014/104/EU provided codification and clarification at EU level. Its Article 11(1) establishes a clear rule: infringers of competition law are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the joint infringement. This rule introduces three key elements: This is reinforced by CJEU case law, which directly anchors joint and several liability in Article 101 TFEU: Transposition in Spain: the consolidation of the joint and several liability model Spanish law incorporated this system through the amendment of the Competition Act (Ley de Defensa de la Competencia) by Royal Decree-Law 9/2017. Since then, at the very latest, the general rule is clear: infringers of competition law are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused. In this respect, it is important to situate “joint and several liability” within the broader framework of Spanish civil law. Under the Civil Code, joint and several liability (solidaridad) is not the default rule: obligations are generally presumed to be divisible and apportioned (mancomunadas) unless the law or the parties expressly provide otherwise. Joint and several liability, by contrast, is an exceptional regime that allows the creditor to claim the full performance from any of the co-debtors. This is precisely what distinguishes joint and several liability from other forms of plural liability in Spanish private law, where each debtor would otherwise only be liable for their proportional share. From a doctrinal perspective, it is important to distinguish this classical civil law notion of solidarity from its operation in competition damages. While both are referred to in Spanish as “solidaridad”, they are not fully identical in conceptual terms. Civil Code solidarity is an exceptional allocation rule within a system that otherwise favours division of liability, whereas in competition law joint and several liability operates as a structurally mandated mechanism designed to ensure effectiveness of enforcement. For this reason, it can be defined as a functional or “improper” form of solidarity, in which the legal system deliberately departs from the principle of individualised causal attribution in order to address the evidential and economic complexity of cartel damages. Directive 2014/104/EU and its transposition into Spanish law constitute a deliberate departure from this traditional civil law logic. In the context of competition damages, the law expressly imposes joint and several liability because the harm generated by a cartel is not realistically divisible in a meaningful or economically coherent way. The overcharge results from a single, coordinated infringement rather than from isolated acts capable of precise causal segmentation. For that reason, allocating exact portions of damage to each infringer would be both evidentially unworkable and normatively artificial. Joint and several liability therefore serves a functional purpose: it ensures full compensation for victims, avoids under-enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, and shifts the complexity of internal apportionment away from the claimant and onto the infringers themselves. However, although the Directive’s rule on joint and several liability is formally a substantive provision and, pursuant to Article 22(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU, applies only to infringements occurring after the expiry of the transposition period, its normative significance must be read in light of the Court of Justice’s clarification in Tráficos Manuel Ferrer (para. 61), according to which Article 11(1) of the Directive merely codifies pre-existing case law of the Court. From this perspective,
Wenzel Logistics: interest on cartel damages runs from each overcharge, not from the lawsuit
In Wenzel Logistics v Mercedes-Benz[mfn]Judgment of 30 April 2026 in Case C‑191/25, Wenzel Logistics GmbH v. Mercedes-Benz Group AG, ECLI:EU:C:2026:360[/mfn], the European Court of Justice (CJEU) confirmed that Austrian civil-law rules which postpone the accrual of interest until the debtor has been put on notice cannot be applied where they prevent full compensation for harm caused by an infringement of EU competition law. Interest must accrue from the time the harm occurred. This applies regardless of whether the harm occurred before or after the Antitrust Damages Directive entered into force. In cartel cases, interest will usually start accruing on each date on which the injured party paid an overcharge. A. Introduction The Wenzel Logistics case arose from an antitrust damages action before the Austrian courts due to the European-wide trucks cartel. Wenzel Logistics, a transport company established in Austria that had bought trucks from distributors of several participants in that cartel, claimed damages for inflated truck prices and also sought statutory interest from the date the harm occurred. The lower courts awarded interest only from notification of the action (here 21 January 2021), relying on general Austrian civil-law rules under which interest accrues only once the claim has been asserted in quantified terms by formal notice or in court. They held that the special provisions under national competition law which would have granted interest from the occurrence of the harm did not apply to the case at hand ratione temporis. Austria’s Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof, OGH) referred the matter to the CJEU. The CJEU held that the Austrian lower courts’ interpretation would undermine the effectiveness of EU competition law, namely the ban of cartels under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Interest must run from the date the harm occurred. This will usually be the date the injured party paid the inflated cartel price. B. Interest on antitrust damages Under EU competition law (Articles 101, 102 TFEU), anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of its rules can claim compensation for actual loss, for gain of which that person has been deprived, plus interest. As recognized by EU Directive 2014/104 on antitrust damages, the payment of interest is an essential component of such compensation to make good the damage sustained by taking into account the effluxion of time and should be due from the time when the harm occurred until the time when compensation is paid. It is incumbent on the Member States to lay down the rules to be applied for that purpose. In practice, the dies a quo is of huge economic importance. As an example (modelled on the case at hand): Assume that a transport company such as Wenzel Logistics, paid for a truck on 21 January 2001 and that the paid price included a cartel-induced overcharge of EUR 5,000. On 21 January 2026, the accrued interest (with the simple interest rate of a fixed four percent in place in Austria) would amount to either a) EUR 5,000 = 25*0.04*5,000, if interest runs from the date of the harm; or b) EUR 1,000 = 5*0.04*5,000, if interest runs only as of the pendency of the claim. So, a five-fold difference in interest. C. The Austrian law provisions Under general Austrian civil law — §§ 1000(2) and 1333(1) ABGB (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) — harm caused by delay in payment of a monetary claim is compensated through statutory interest, which only starts accruing once the action is pending (Streitanhängigkeit). For Wenzel Logistics, that date was 21 January 2021, when the action was served on Mercedes-Benz. The Austrian Competition Act (Kartellgesetz, KartG) law contains, and in prior versions contained, special provisions that do allow interest to run from the date of harm. But the temporal-application rules in §86 KartG prevented those special provisions from having any practically useful effect for Wenzel Logistics. §37a KartG (2013 version) required undertakings liable for a competition law infringement to pay interest on the resulting damages from the date of harm. Under §86 KartG (2013 version), however, that provision applied only to infringements committed after 28 February 2013. §§37c and 37d KartG (2017 amendment, BGBl. I 56/2017), transposing the Damages Directive, went further: §37d(1) confirmed that compensation also covers loss of profit, and §37d(2), applying §1333 ABGB mutatis mutandis, required interest from the date of harm. But §86(8)–(9) KartG limited these provisions to harm occurring after 26 December 2016. The trucks cartel ran from 17 January 1997 to 18 January 2011. The infringement therefore ended well before 28 February 2013, and no part of the harm occurred after 26 December 2016 — so under Austrian law alone, neither provision of the KartG applied, and Wenzel Logistics was thrown back on the general ABGB rules. D. The OGH’s questions and the CJEU’s answers In its request for a preliminary ruling, the OGH asked the CJEU, in essence, (i) whether Article 3(2) of the Damages Directive applies to claims brought after 26 December 2014, and (ii) whether the relevant date of harm is the date on which the inflated price was paid.[mfn]Full text of the questions: ‘(1) Should Article 3(2) of Directive [2014/104], read in conjunction with Article 22(2) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that Article 3(2), relating to the payment of interest for harm caused by a cartel, applies to actions for damages brought before a national court after 26 December 2014? If that question is answered in the negative: what other date should be used for the purpose of applying Article 3(2) of Directive [2014/104][/mfn] With regard to the first question, the CJEU’s answer shows that the framing that focuses on the temporal application of the Directive partially misses the point. In the key paragraphs 45–51 of its judgment, the Court clarifies that the rule that interest accrues from the date of harm was already part of EU law before the Damages Directive was adopted. Article 3(2) of that directive did not create the right to interest from the time of harm; it codified an existing right that
Trucks Cartels: Amsterdam District Court finds 7% overcharge and run-off period of over two years
On 15 April 2026, the Amsterdam District Court has ruled that the European Trucks cartel caused a price overcharge of 7%. In an interim judgment handed down in proceedings brought by Retail Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) and concerning roughly 60,000 trucks, the Court endorsed the methodology and econometric analysis of CDC’s experts, Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leo Huberts (University of Amsterdam), as well as the quality of the underlying data submitted by CDC. The Court also found that the run-off period lasted until 30 May 2013. Dutch original (html), English convenience translation (pdf), (html). Background CDC’s action, filed in July 2017, pertains to about 60,000 trucks sourced by over 700 affected companies, that sold and transferred their damage claims to CDC (“assignors”). In substantiating the claim, CDC had submitted almost 200,000 documents. The 15 April 2026 judgment concerns the first action brought by CDC against DAF, MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, and Iveco for damages resulting from their participation in the European Trucks cartel. In addition, in June 2020, CDC filed a second action for damages relating to over 30,000 trucks purchased or leased by close to 400 companies. The CDC actions are based on the decision of the European Commission of 19 July 2016 (Case AT.39824 – Trucks) which found the truck manufacturers had coordinated the pricing for medium and heavy trucks and the timing for the introduction of emission reduction technologies as well as the passing on of the costs for such technologies to customers. The Commission imposed record fines of several billion euros for the infringement which covered the entire EEA and lasted 14 years. The trucks cartel has spawned damages claims across the EU to a hitherto unparalleled extent. The judgment addresses key aspects of the quantification of the damage but does not constitute a final ruling yet. At this stage, the Court determined that the cartel resulted in a price overcharge of 7% on trucks and that the effects of the infringement continued during a run-off period lasting until 30 May 2013. With respect to the so-called passing-on defence raised by the defendants, the court held that further examination is necessary and that the debate on this issue will continue in the next phase of the proceedings. Findings on overcharge and duration In earlier interim judgments, the Court had already answered affirmatively the question of whether the Trucks cartel infringement could cause harm to the assignors. This assessment was reaffirmed in the present judgment, characterising the theory of harm presented by CDC’s experts conclusive and convincing. At the same time, it rejected the approach taken by the defendants’ experts, in particular their modelling of brand and country combinations in isolation. The court concluded that the cartel resulted in an increase in truck prices and sets the resulting overcharge at 7% of the purchase price. This conclusion is based primarily on the econometric regression analysis submitted by CDC’s experts, which compares actual transaction prices with a counterfactual scenario in which the cartel is assumed not to have existed. The court accepts this analysis as a reliable basis for its assessment, considering both the underlying dataset and the methodology to be sufficiently robust and representative. The court also addresses the evidentiary value of the data relied upon by the defendants, expressing particular reservations about their internally constructed cost series. In doing so, it refers to case law from the English Competition Appeal Tribunal and the Borgarting Court of Appeal in Norway, highlighting concerns relating to potential endogeneity and a lack of transparency. The court furthermore ruled on the duration of the cartel’s effects. While the European Commission identified 18 January 2011 as the formal end date of the infringement, the court held that its impact on prices continued beyond that date. It established a “run-off” period lasting until 30 May 2013, during which cartel effects were considered to persist. Volume and Value of Commerce The judgment provides guidance on determining both the volume and value of commerce relevant for damage calculations. Regarding volume, the court set out principles for identifying which truck transactions qualify for compensation. It accepted that, in the absence of invoices, alternative documentation such as vehicle registrations or official database records may be used to substantiate transactions. This approach aligns with broader developments in European case law on evidentiary standards in cartel damages actions, including the clarification provided by the Spanish Supreme Court in its judgment STS 71/2026, where accounting and indirect documentation were recognised as valid means of proof under certain conditions, even in the absence of original invoices. On value, the court ruled that the purchase prices and leasing instalments paid by CDC’s assignors, as captured by CDC, are the appropriate basis for the calculation of damages, rather than prices paid by dealers. It also accepted CDC’s methodology for estimating missing pricing data in cases where exact information was no longer available. Emissions-related claims CDC had also argued that the delayed introduction of emissions-reducing technologies led to higher operating costs, including increased fuel consumption and toll expenses. The court did not accept this claim, finding that the alleged damages had not been sufficiently substantiated. Limitation period The court rejected arguments from the defendants that the claims were time-barred under Dutch law. It held that the limitation period did not begin until 7 April 2017, when a summary of the European Commission’s decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union. As the proceedings were initiated within five years of that date, the claims were deemed timely. The court also dismissed arguments based on the 20-year objective limitation period, concluding that it only commences to run once the infringement has ceased. Passing-on defence The court addressed the so-called passing-on defence, under which defendants argue that any overcharge was passed on by purchasers to their own customers and should therefore reduce recoverable damages. At this stage, the court did not reach a final determination on this issue. It confirmed that the burden of proof lies with the defendants but indicated that further examination
Accounting evidence as proof of purchase in cartel litigation: The Spanish Supreme Court clarifies the standard (STS 71/2026)
In the Truck Cartel case, the Spanish Supreme Court has refined the evidentiary framework governing antitrust damages actions. According to its judgment of 27 January 2026 (STS 71/2026), accounting documentation may constitute sufficient evidence to prove the purchase price and, consequently, the existence and quantification of harm, even in the absence of original invoices. This ruling forms part of the Court’s broader effort to balance procedural rigor with the principle of effectiveness in the private enforcement of competition law. Background: a familiar dispute with an evidentiary twist The case arises from a follow-on damages action against Renault Trucks following the European Commission’s 2016 decision on the trucks cartel. As in many similar claims, the dispute did not concern only the existence of harm, but also its quantification and, in particular, the proof of the purchase price of vehicles acquired by the claimants many years earlier. The Audiencia Provincial had denied compensation for two trucks on the basis that the claimants could not produce the original invoices and relied solely on internal accounting records. The Supreme Court overturned this approach. Accounting records as valid proof of purchase price A central holding of the Court is the recognition of accounting documentation as probative evidence, even without additional supporting documents. The Court’s reasoning rests on two key elements. First, where the authenticity of accounting documents is not challenged, they must be treated as fully probative under Articles 319 and 326 of the Civil Procedure Act. In this case, the defendant did not contest the authenticity of the accounting entries at the preliminary hearing, which is decisive for their evidentiary value. Second, the Court rejects the requirement imposed by the lower court that such documentation be corroborated through additional evidence or linked to formal accounting books. Imposing such a requirement amounts to an excessive and unjustified evidentiary burden. As a result, the Supreme Court confirms that accounting entries can suffice to establish the acquisition price, particularly in the absence of contrary evidence. Passage of time and the principle of effectiveness The Court places significant weight on the temporal context of cartel damages litigation. Many of the relevant transactions took place around twenty years before the claim was brought to trial. Against this background, the Court considers it unreasonable to require claimants to retain invoices beyond the statutory six-year retention period under the national Commercial Code. Requiring documentation whose preservation is no longer legally mandated would, in practice, impose a stricter obligation than that provided for by law. Denying probative value to accounting records in such circumstances would make the exercise of the right to damages resulting from an infringement of EU competition law “practically impossible or excessively difficult”, thereby infringing the EU principle of effectiveness. This reasoning aligns with the Court’s prior case law: procedural requirements cannot be applied in a way that effectively recreates or extends expired legal obligations. The judgment thus reinforces the idea that evidentiary rules must facilitate, rather than hinder, competition damages actions. A broader evidentiary approach: flexibility over formalism The judgment reflects a broader trend toward evidentiary flexibility in cartel damages litigation. It implicitly acknowledges the structural asymmetry between claimants and defendants, particularly in access to historical pricing data. A key element of the decision is the treatment of the claimant’s accounting documents. The Court attaches decisive importance to the fact that their authenticity was not challenged at the appropriate procedural stage, with the result that they must be accepted as evidence of the prices recorded in the claimant’s accounts. In this respect, the judgment highlights the procedural consequences of failing to properly contest documentary evidence in due time. At the same time, the Court’s reasoning provides some indications, albeit indirectly, as to what may be required from a defendant seeking to rebut the claimant’s case. In particular, while the defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to contest the existence of harm, the Court found that it had not adduced sufficiently convincing evidence capable of undermining the presumption of damage or the reasoning on which it was based. In this context, it should not be understood as a complete absence of defence, but rather as a failure to effectively engage with the evidentiary basis of the claim, by not putting forward a robust alternative explanation and relying on expert evidence that does not adequately address the premises underlying the presumption. That said, caution is warranted not to overinterpret the judgment. The Court does not articulate a general standard of what would constitute a sufficient substantive rebuttal, nor does it specify in abstract terms the type of evidence that would be required for that purpose. The assessment remains closely tied to the particular circumstances of the case, including the characteristics of the cartel and the weaknesses identified in the defendant’s expert report. Even so, the decision suggests that, in practice, overcoming the evidentiary framework applicable in cartel damages actions may prove demanding for defendants. Where a presumption of harm is grounded in well-established factual and economic considerations, it is unlikely to be displaced by purely formal objections or by evidence that does not directly confront its underlying logic. Implications for ERP and CRM data as evidence Although the case concerns traditional accounting records, its reasoning extends naturally to modern forms of business documentation, including ERP systems and CRM databases. Several implications can be drawn. First, there is a clear functional equivalence: digital records that reflect transaction data should be treated similarly to accounting entries. In practice, such records may even offer a higher degree of detail and traceability than traditional accounting documents, which can enhance their evidentiary value. Second, where such data is generated and maintained in the ordinary course of business, it may carry significant weight as evidence, particularly if its authenticity is not sufficiently contested. This is especially so given that such systems are typically used to comply with tax and corporate record-keeping obligations and may, in some cases, be subject to external verification or auditing. Third, courts should be cautious about requiring additional corroboration where
Webinar – The European Circle for Competition Damages
On 26 March 2026 (12:30–14:00 CET), The European Circle for Competition Damages brought together leading practitioners and academics for a focused discussion on: “Google Shopping: Overview of Damage Actions Across Europe with a Focus on the recent Idealo & Producto judgments.” The webinar explored the recent landmark rulings of the Regional Court Berlin, awarding damages of €425 million (Idealo) and €107 million (Producto), and their implications for damages claims across Europe. Speakers: Prof. Dr. Sarah Legner Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel (Germany)Prof. Dr. Thomas Höppner, Partner at Geradin Partners (Germany) Followed by a Pan-European overview of Google Shopping damages actions: Miguel Sousa Ferro, Partner at Sousa Ferro e Associados (Portugal)Marie de Drouas, Partner at Niddam Drouas Avocats (France)Ben Lasserson, Partner at Mishcon de Reya LLP (the UK)Philine Wassenaar, Associate at Geradin Partners (the Netherlands) Date: March 26, 2026Time: 12:30 pm CET; Zoom webinar
Trucks cartel: first Milan judgment on antitrust damage claims
Introduction On 11 January 2026, the Court of Milan, Business Section A (the ‘Court’), delivered a significant ruling[1] in follow-on antitrust damages litigation brought by 18 transport companies against Iveco and the other major truck manufacturers MAN, DAF, Scania, Mercedes-Benz (Daimler), and Volvo/Renault. The case stems from the European Commission’s (‘Commission’) landmark decision (the ‘EC Decision’)[2] finding that these manufacturers participated in a long-running Europe-wide cartel between 1997 and 2011, coordinating gross list prices and the timing of the introduction of new emission technologies (‘Trucks cartel’). The Court’s judgment adds an important chapter to the growing body of national litigation arising from the Trucks cartel and offers valuable insights into the evolving landscape of private antitrust enforcement in Italy. Chronology of the proceedings Filing of the claim On 5 October 2017, a group of transport companies filed a claim before the Court against Iveco, seeking compensation for damages caused by its participation in the Trucks cartel. The claimants, having purchased medium and heavy trucks from manufacturers involved in the infringement, alleged that they had suffered substantial harm as a result of the established anticompetitive conduct. In particular, they sought compensation for (i) the overcharge paid on the purchase of trucks as a result of the coordination of gross list prices, and (ii) the harm arising from the coordinated delay in introducing new emission technologies (EURO 3 to 6), which allegedly deprived them of the opportunity to acquire vehicles equipped with the most advanced emission standards available at the time. Overall, the total damage claim amounted to more than €5 million. Defence and preliminary objections In its defence, Iveco requested authorisation to summon the other members of the Trucks cartel as third parties in the proceedings. Furthermore, Iveco raised several preliminary and substantive objections, including: statutory limitation defences; challenges to the applicability and retroactive effect of Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages[3] and its Italian implementing legislation (Legislative Decree No. 3/2017)[4]; requests for referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Italian Constitutional Court; objections to the evidentiary value of the EC Decision; and arguments contesting both the existence of an overcharge and the claimants’ passing-on of that overcharge to their own customers. Third-party summons and limitation ruling The other parties raised similar objections, particularly concerning the statute of limitations and the lack of proof of actual impact on final net prices. On 24 May 2021, the Court issued a partial judgment which rejected the limitation objection, ruling that the limitation period had not expired. This judgment was confirmed by the Milan Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Cassation and has therefore become final. Scania-related claims Initially, the Court separated claims related to Scania trucks because Scania had appealed the Commission’s findings. Once the General Court[5] confirmed the decision against Scania in 2022, these claims were rejoined in the main proceedings. Expert assessment The proceedings then moved into the evidentiary phase. The Court required a court-appointed expert assessment (Consulente Tecnico d’Ufficio, ‘CTU’) to assist in the technical and economic evaluation of the claims. The CTU was tasked with determining (i) whether and to what extent the Trucks cartel influenced the net purchase prices of vehicles acquired by the claimants; (ii) whether and to what extent the cartel caused an overcharge on the final purchase price of the trucks concerned; (iii) which specific vehicles fell within the infringement or its subsequent lingering period; (iv) whether the overcharge was passed on to downstream customers and, if so, to calculate the potential loss of profits resulting from it; and (v) whether the delay in the introduction of new emission technology caused damage and, if so, to determine the extent of such damage. This mandate was later expanded to specifically incorporate findings from the Commission and General Court decisions regarding the Scania group and to integrate additional questions for the CTU’s assessment, namely: (vi) determine the applicable monetary revaluation and legal interest; (vii) consider the impact of tax benefits obtained by the claimants; and (viii) identify which documents were strictly necessary to avoid a “massive” and potentially irrelevant production of documents. Settlement proposal On 30 April 2025, the Court proposed a settlement: a 5% overcharge for the infringement period and 2.5% for a short lingering period. The claimants accepted the proposal, but Iveco, Scania, and MAN rejected it. Notably, in September 2025, Volvo/Renault and Mercedes-Benz (Daimler) reached separate out-of-court settlements with several claimants. The remaining case against Iveco and the non-settling third parties was then submitted to the panel for the final judgment. Judgment by the Court of Milan Binding nature of the EC Decision The Court reaffirmed that the Commission’s decisions (both the 2016 settlement decision and the 2017 Scania decision[6]) are legally binding on national courts regarding the existence of the antitrust infringement. This binding effect applies even to decisions reached through a settlement procedure, as the manufacturers voluntarily acknowledged their responsibility. Rejection of the limitation defence The defendants’ argument that the claims were time-barred was rejected. The Court ruled that the limitation period only began to run once the victims became aware of the infringement and the resulting damage, which in this case was the publication of the EC Decision. Temporal application of the Damages Directive The Court addressed the temporal applicability of Directive 2014/104/EU and Legislative Decree No. 3/2017, both adopted after the infringement had ended. It concluded that their substantive provisions do not apply retroactively. As a result, the presumption that cartels cause harm and the presumption in favour of indirect purchasers were deemed inapplicable. However, this did not preclude the finding of damage. The Court relied on general civil law principles to conclude that the Trucks cartel was highly likely to have generated an overcharge. Likewise, the burden of proving any passing-on remained with the defendants. Existence and nature of damage In light of its duration and market coverage, the Court concluded that the Trucks cartel inevitably led to an overcharge for final purchasers. It further confirmed that the infringement covered all purchases
From price-fixing to wage-fixing: are labour markets the next frontier of public and private competition law enforcement?
The recent investigation launched by the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) into an alleged cartel among producers of automated packaging machines is a timely illustration of an emerging trend in competition law enforcement. By placing labour market restrictions at the centre of its analysis, the AGCM joins a broader movement – both at EU and national level, but also beyond – that focuses on collusion among employers as a direct infringement of competition rules. Beyond public enforcement, such practices also foster closer attention to the potential use of private remedies as a means for affected workers to obtain compensation for the harm caused by collusion at the employer level.
A 5% Overcharge as Minimum Damages for Antitrust Violations?! Recent Developments in Europe
Courts throughout Europe increasingly adopt a minimum damages approach in antitrust cases, unanimously presuming at least a 5% overcharge, driven by grounds of compensation, effectiveness and deterrence. Recent judgments – from the CAT (UK) to the Spanish Supreme Court, Norway’s courts, the Court of Appeal in Stuttgart, the Dieselgate rulings of the German and Austrian Supreme Courts, and finally the European Court of Justice – point to a converging practice and a structured approach to quantifying damages across the EU.