Spanish Supreme Court confirms judgment awarding overcharge in excess of 10% in the trucks cartel: key takeaways from judgment STS 5861/2025
The Supreme Court Judgment STS 5861/2025 of 18 December 2025 represents a significant development in damages litigation arising from the trucks cartel in Spain as it confirms for the first time the judicial estimation of a second instance court awarding an overcharge of more than 10%. The Supreme Court has fully dismissed the appeals brought by Renault Trucks S.A.S., reinforcing the power of judicial estimation and confirming the overall trend towards an effective and adequate compensation of anticompetitive harm by way of judicial estimation, based on the facts of the infringement as established in the decision by the European Commission and in line with principles of European Union law. The ruling was issued in the context of an extraordinary appeal for procedural infringement and a cassation appeal against Judgment SAP C 2975/2022 by the second instance Provincial Court of A Coruña of 4 November 2022. The proceedings before the Supreme Court opposed Renault Trucks S.A.S., as appellant, and Aluminios Cortizo S.A.U., as respondent. The origin of the dispute: Aluminios Cortizo’s damage action against Renault Trucks The case originated with the damage action by Aluminios Cortizo S.A.U. against Renault Trucks S.A.S. before the first instance Commercial Court No. 1 of A Coruña. The court partially upheld the claim and ordered Renault to pay damages equivalent to 5% of the purchase price of each of the 12 trucks concerned, together with statutory interest accruing from the date of acquisition. Appeal proceedings: recognising a 16.35% overcharge, applying a 1/3 reduction Both parties appealed the first-instance judgment. The Provincial Court of A Coruña dismissed Renault’s appeal, ordering it to pay the costs, and partially upheld Aluminios Cortizo’s appeal. The Provincial Court found the claimant’s expert evidence (the so called Caballer report) to be more persuasive than the reports submitted by Renault Trucks which argued for zero damage. The court therefore concluded that the average overcharge on net prices amounted to 16.35%. Taking into account the uncertainties identified in the report itself, the court reduced the resulting figures by one third. Supreme Court endorsement of methodology and outcome The Supreme Court does not revise or abandon its established case law awarding a 5% compensation rate as a reference point in trucks cartel litigation. Based on the specific arguments raised by Renault in the cassation, which were targeting the judicial estimation as such without contesting the assessment of the appellate court of the Caballer report, the Supreme Court reiterates the power of courts to estimate the damage. It also confirmed that the 5% overcharge percentage is not an automatic or immutable standard, but a starting point that may be adjusted by the competent courts in light of the evidentiary record of each individual case. The Supreme Court therefore fully endorsed the judicial estimation by the Provincial Court, in particular the reasoning of the Provincial Court and the amount of compensation awarded, rejecting all grounds of appeal raised by Renault. As set out above, Renault did not challenge the assessment of the economic report by the Provincial Court so that the outcome was driven by the – possibly flawed – cassation strategy. Of particular relevance beyond the specific case is the Supreme Court’s express confirmation that judges may rely on rebuttable judicial presumptions (iuris tantum) under Article 386 of the Spanish Civil Procedure Act where objective circumstances justify doing so. This applies in particular to pre-Directive cases such as the trucks cartel. In this regard, the Supreme Court emphasised: the exceptional long duration of the cartel (14 years); its extensive geographical scope, covering the entire European Economic Area; a market share approaching 90%; and which involved discussions and agreements regarding the fixing and increase of gross prices. Against this backdrop, the Court held that it is both economically rational and legally reasonable to presume the existence of an overcharge harming purchasers. Presumable, not automatic, harm The judgment draws an important distinction: the doctrine of ex re ipsa does not apply automatically. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court makes clear that the existence of harm may be presumed in light of the trucks cartel’s characteristics (see above), subject to proof to the contrary. In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed the reasoning of the Provincial Court according to which Renault’s expert report failed to rebut that presumption, as it was based on flawed assumptions and underestimated the scope of the collusive conduct described in the European Commission’s Decision. The Court also expressly confirms that courts may rely on economic expert evidence to quantify harm and, where precise quantification is not possible, adjust the figures through reasoned judicial discretion. Statutory interest from the date of purchase, also in cases of leasing Another point of practical importance is the confirmation that statutory interest must accrue from the date the truck was purchased, even where the acquisition was made through leasing arrangements. The Court reasoned that the harm materialises when the purchaser pays an inflated price as a result of the cartel. Any delay in the dies a quo would lead to undercompensation, contrary to the EU law principle of full compensation. A turning point in damages quantification? The relevance of the present judgement therefore lies not in a doctrinal shift on the 5% standard overcharge in cases of a judicial estimation in the trucks case. The fact that the Supreme Court confirmed the judicial estimation of the second instance court exceeding 10% may be the result of the specific cassation arguments (not) raised by Renault. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court confirms for the first time in the trucks cartel litigation that judicial estimations with a higher levels of compensation are compatible with its case law, where in view of the competent judges this is justified by robust expert evidence and the facts established by the competition authorities. More broadly, the decision strengthens the power of judges to estimate damages and thus the principle of effectiveness of EU law and the objective of full compensation. The message from the Supreme Court is clear: large-scale, long-lasting cartels like the trucks cartel are unlikely to
Dairy Cartel – the next level of private antitrust enforcement: Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid finds a 9.4% undercharge
On 16 October 2025, Commercial Court No. 14 of Madrid delivered a judgment[1] of notable relevance in the well-known Spanish Dairy Cartel case. The decision, issued by Judge Ms Carmen González Suárez in Ordinary Proceedings No. 588/2022, partially upheld a private damage claim brought against Grupo Lactalis Iberia, S.A. (Lactalis) and Industrias Lácteas de Granada, S.L.U. (Puleva), recognising their participation in a collusive agreement that affected the Spanish national market for the supply of raw milk between 2000 and 2013. The Court found that the defendants engaged in a systematic exchange of commercially sensitive information leading to price-fixing, allocation of farmers (suppliers), and control of surpluses, thereby infringing Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Act (Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, LDC). Unlike most cartel cases, where producers or suppliers of a certain product are engaged in anti-competitive agreements, the Dairy Cartel concerns antitrust practices conducted by the buyers, namely the companies buying raw milk, who aimed at achieving a cheaper supply by preventing farmers from negotiating prices on fair terms. This judgment represents a significant step forward in consolidating civil actions arising from such kind of anti-competitive practices. It also establishes important criteria regarding the statute of limitations, the quantification of damages, and the application of compensatory and default interest. The Court accepted the methodology of the claimant’s experts and found a 9.4% undercharge in the raw milk market At the heart of this case lies the assessment and quantification of harm caused by the buyers’ cartel, which is an exceptional scenario in competition law. Unlike a traditional sellers’ cartel, where undertakings collude to raise prices or restrict output, a buyers’ cartel involves coordination among purchasers to depress input prices. In this instance, major dairy processors exchanged sensitive commercial information and agreed on purchasing strategies to keep the prices paid to farmers artificially low. On the quantification of harm, the Court rejected a mere judicial estimation[2], and instead, conducted a detailed technical assessment of the economic expert evidence submitted. The judgment, with certain qualifications, accepted the methodology of the claimant’s experts, considering it the most robust and coherent from an econometric perspective. The Court’s analysis focused on the price undercharge, that is, the mirror image of the classic “overcharge” observed in sellers’ cartels. A buyers’ cartel pushes prices downward below what would have prevailed in a properly functioning market with a fairer balance of bargaining power between suppliers and buyers. This leads to a distorted distribution of resources and profits between the suppliers and the purchasers undermining the competitive process. In this case, the farmers suppling raw milk could have obtained a higher price absent the cartel, which would have supported more efficient competitive dynamics in Spain’s raw-milk market enhancing the viability of the farmers’ operations. However, the coordinated purchasing behaviour of the cartelists prevented that outcome. Accordingly, the undercharge represents the difference between the prices actually received by the farmers and those that would have prevailed under competitive conditions. Two complementary methods were employed: oligopolistic simulations and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) analysis. The simulations assessed competition in prices and quantities (Bertrand and Cournot models), considering the market shares of the participants according to CNMC data. The results indicated prices between 8.6% and 13.9% lower for transactions involving cartel members, and between 7.3% and 9.6% lower for non-members as a consequence of the umbrella effect. The DiD analysis, comparing price trends in Spain with unaffected markets (Portugal and Italy) during and after the infringement period, revealed prices between 9.4% and 11% lower. The consistency between both methods reinforced the robustness of the conclusions. Both approaches incorporated controls relating to the Consumer Price Index, import levels, and milk quality, as well as sensitivity analyses to test the reliability of results. However, because the claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence, the Court limited the affected volume of commerce to sales made directly to the cartel participants, excluding potential umbrella effects. As noted, this limitation was due to the lack of adequate evidence, not to a finding that such effects did not occur. In other words, the Judge did not question the general validity of the umbrella effect but concluded that the evidence presented in this case was insufficient to substantiate their occurrence. Exercising discretion, the Judge ultimately fixed the level of undercharge at 9.4%, adopting the lower bound of the range estimated by the claimant, as the mid-point proposed by the experts was deemed insufficiently justified. This finding is particularly noteworthy as it provides a judicially endorsed quantification of harm in a buyers’ cartel context, an area where economic methodologies and legal reasoning have historically been underdeveloped. By validating the use of advanced econometric tools such as simulation models and DiD analysis, the judgment sets an important precedent for future private enforcement actions in Spain. The limitation period had not yet begun to run while judicial review proceedings remain pending Regarding the statute of limitations, the Madrid Court applies the recent Supreme Court doctrine on the computation of limitation periods in antitrust damages cases. Referring to the Supreme Court judgments 889/2025 of 5 June 2025 and 2857/2025 of 17 June 2025, issued concerning the Envelopes Cartel, the Madrid Court rejected the argument that the limitation period began to run upon the mere publication of the administrative infringement decision. Rather, in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU, judgment of 22 June 2022, Case C-267/20, AB Volvo and DAF Trucks NV v RM) and the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in the Sugar Cartel case (STS 408/2012), the initial point for the running of time must be the date on which the administrative decision becomes final. In the present case, the CNMC (Spanish National Competition Authority) Decision has been appealed by its addressees, and some appeals are still pending, including those filed by Lactalis and Puleva, who were the defendants in the case at hand. The Court held that the limitation
The CJEU strengthens cartel victims’ rights: a landmark ruling on limitation periods
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 4 September 2025 has issued a landmark ruling in Case C-21/24, CP v. Nissan Iberia, which strengthens the position of cartel victims, not only in Spain but across the European Union. This preliminary ruling decision, following a referral by the Commercial Court No. 1 of Zaragoza, deals with the question of when the limitation period starts running in a follow-on damages action based on a decision by a national competition authority (NCA). Precisely, the question was when a cartel victim can be considered to have sufficient knowledge about the infringement, harm and identity of the infringers. The CJEU confirms that the applicable limitation period can only start to run once the NCA’s decision has become final and the decision as well as the relevant appeal judgments have been published. This implies, that limitation periods are not running for the entire period during which NCA decisions are under judicial review, until the final resolution of the appeals. Background: The Nissan Iberia case In 2015, the Spanish NCA (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, “CNMC”) sanctioned several car manufacturers, including Nissan, for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The decision was published on the CNMC’s website on September 15, 2015, accompanied by a press release and extensive media coverage. However, inter alia Nissan appealed the decision, and it was not until 2021 that the Supreme Court upheld the sanction, resulting in the finality of the decision. In March 2023, a consumer that had purchased a car (‘CP’), filed a damage action with the Zaragoza court. Nissan argued that the action was time-barred, asserting that the one-year limitation period should be counted from the publication in 2015 on the website of the CNMC, as CP must be considered to have required «knowledge» of the infringement to trigger the limitation period’s start (dies a quo) at that time. The Zaragoza court referred a preliminary question to the CJEU. An appealed decision by an NCA cannot trigger the start of limitation periods The CJEU, in line with Advocate General (AG) Medina, rejected Nissan’s argument. The Court emphasizes that a cartel decision by an NCA whose validity has been judicially challenged does not have the same binding effect as a decision by the European Commission. Unlike Commission decisions, which are immediately binding on national courts, an NCA decision only has binding effect once it is final. The CJEU’s reasoning here establishes a crucial principle with EU-wide importance. The same logic would apply, for example, to a German follow-on damages action based on a decision by the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) that is subject to judicial review. As the Court states (para. 63 and 64), «a court hearing an action for damages… may be bound by the finding of the existence of that infringement only where that decision has become final.» Therefore, a decision of an NCA whose validity has been judicially challenged «is not of that nature,» which means that the claimant and the court has at its disposal «information which is not definitive.» The uncertainty created by an appeal prevents the victim from reasonably knowing the essential information to file a damage action. In such a situation, the cartel victim’s ability to bring a follow-on action for damages would be undermined, and it would be “excessively difficult” for that victim to exercise his right to compensation, in conflict with Article 101 TFEU and the effectiveness principle. The CJEU considered (para. 67) that insofar as the national court deciding on an action for damages is not bound by the finding of the existence of the infringement concerned unless the NCA decision has become final, the victim cannot reasonably be considered to have become aware of the information necessary to bring an action for damages on the basis of that decision. The judgment also rejects Nissan Iberia’s argument that an NCA’s website is a «State Official Bulletin» equivalent to the Official Journal of the European Union, as it lacks the same binding character. Impact on objective limitation periods An important aspect of the judgment is its impact on objective limitation periods under national law. The CJEU’s ruling, while interpreting national rules on a subjective limitation period (the one-year period from knowledge), effectively confirms that the principle of effectiveness dictates that a time limit cannot start running before a victim has the necessary knowledge of all elements of a damage claim, namely: the existence of an infringement of competition law, the existence of damage, the causal link between that damage and that infringement, and the identity of the infringer. This is crucial because it includes situations where an objective limitation period, which might start from the date of the infringement, could otherwise expire while the NCA decision is being appealed, or even before it is formally adopted. This is detrimental to the affected parties, as the expiration of the limitation period before they have the essential information to substantiate their action would make the exercise of their right to be compensated practically impossible. The importance of official publications of NCA decisions and judgments The Court clarifies (para. 74) that the requirement for knowledge of indispensable information to file a damages action not only requires that the NCA decision becomes final but also that the indispensable information resulting from that final resolution is made publicly available in an adequate manner. This is evident from the reference to the CENDOJ (para. 77), the Spanish system for the publication of judicial judgments. The reasoning the CJEU establishes for the requirement for an official publication applies accordingly to decisions of NCAs. This is particularly relevant in countries (e.g. Germany), where NCAs do not publish detailed decisions with all facts required to bring a damage claim, but only short press releases or case summaries. In such cases, the victim cannot be considered to have sufficient knowledge. Therefore, the lack of a complete official publication would prevent the limitation period from starting to run, as it would deprive affected parties
Fear of talking? The risks of breaching competition law with public announcements
For those sceptical about the potential of big data-based market screening in cartel detection, the recent judgment of the General Court may offer some encouragement
The Spanish Supreme Court Consolidates Key Aspects on Cartel Damages: A Landmark Judgment in the Envelopes Case
On June 5, 2025, the Spanish Supreme Court issued a ruling that marks a milestone in private competition law enforcement in Spain. The judgment — STS 2621/2025 — resolves the appeal brought by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) against several companies in the paper envelope sector — namely Printeos, Tompla, and Maespa — which had been fined in 2013 by the Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) for participating in a cartel (case S/0316/10).
Commission Finds Apple in Violation of DMA: Significant Impact on App Developers
The European Commission has published one of its first-ever non-compliance decisions under the Digital Markets Act, targeting Apple. By restricting app developers from steering users outside the App Store, Apple may have caused a loss of profit amounting to EUR millions per month. This landmark decision could open the door to the first private claims brought under the DMA.
Advocate General Medina’s opinion on when the limitation clock starts ticking
Can a damages claim for cartel conduct be time-barred if it was filed before the conclusion of the national infringement decision’s judicial review? Advocate General Medina’s Opinion in C 21/24 CP v Nissan Iberia offers a clear answer: limitation periods cannot begin until the existence of the infringement can be relied upon in court. A position that could reshape the landscape of follow-on litigation across the EU.
CJEU confirms the assignment model as an effective means to enforce claims for antitrust damages (ASG 2)
In its much anticipated ruling of 28 January 2025 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice confirmed that it is generally possible for victims of competition law infringements to assign their claims for damages to a commercial plaintiff for the purpose of their joint enforcement.
EUROPEAN SUPERLEAGUE: ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT
1. Introduction At the beginning of 2021, the sports leaders of some of the most influential clubs in Europe, led by the presidents of Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, Florentino Pérez and Joan Laporta, announced the European Super League project. This international competition threatened to rival the well-known UEFA Champions League and disrupt the rigid institutional football system. A week before the UEFA Champions League 2024 final, and with Real Madrid—now champion—and its president once again in the spotlight, the debate on the Super League reemerged with the Judgement of the Commercial Court No. 17 of Madrid (Judgement No. 69/2024, dated May 24: the ‘Judgement’) after the hearing held on March 14, 2024. Before analysing the Judgement, it is worth briefly mentioning the background of the matter and the controversy it has unleashed from a legal standpoint. The proceedings began on April 18, 2021, with the filing of the action along with a request for protective measures to halt the Super League initiative before the commercial courts of Madrid by EUROPEAN SUPERLEAGUE COMPANY, S.L. (ESLC), domiciled in Madrid. Protective measures were ultimately not accepted by the Court. The action was filed on the same day that the ‘founding’ clubs issued a joint press release announcing the official project of the new competition. The project received a mixed response from across Europe, with the objection of public figures such as Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron, who recently reaffirmed his opposition to the project. The Spanish Prime Minister himself, Pedro Sánchez[mfn]The article is only available in Spanish.[/mfn], also took a stand against the initiative. Interestingly, the analysis of the potential anticompetitive nature of the conduct, and the abuse of dominant position by UEFA and FIFA is not carried out by a competition authority (for instance, the European Commission) but by a commercial law judge who directly applies European Union Law without the need for a prior declaration (follow-on) from the competition authorities. Not surprisingly, UEFA and La Liga had challenged the international jurisdiction and other subsidiary jurisdictional pleas in order to avoid litigating in Madrid. The Court dismissed the jurisdiction challenge on 21 February 2022. However, the matter’s reach extended beyond the Spanish capital. The Commercial Court No. 17 of Madrid suspended the proceedings and referred a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU (Case C-333/21 European Superleague Company), to which it raised the compatibility of the prior authorization requirements by UEFA and FIFA as set out in their statutes and regulations with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Opinion of Advocate General Anastasios Rantos, delivered on 15 December, 2022, established the compatibility of the contested articles of the Statutes with European Union law to the extent that the restrictive effects arising from such a scheme are inherent in and proportionate for achieving the legitimate objectives pursued & associated with the specific nature of the sport. The CJEU Judgement was handed down on 21 December, 2023 (ECLI:EU:2023:1011). The judges in this case discuss whether FIFA’s and UEFA’s restrictive measures are inherent and proportionate: ‘Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the adoption and implementation ofrules by associationswhich are responsible for football at world and European levels andwhich pursue in parallel various economic activities related to the organisation of competitions,making subject to their prior approval the setting up, on European Union territory, of a new interclub football competition by a third-party undertaking, and controlling the participation of professional football clubs and players in such a competition, on pain of sanctions, where there is no framework for those various powers providing for substantive criteria and detailed procedural rules suitable for ensuring that they are transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate, constitutes abuse of a dominant position. Article 101(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the adoption and implementation, directly or through their member national football associations, of rules […] constitutes a decision by an association of undertakings having as its object the prevention of competition.’ Thus, the baseline for the 70-page judgement of Mrs. Sofía Gil García of the Court of First Instance No. 17 (challenged by UEFA and La Liga) was to consider the conduct anticompetitive, which will also be the initial point of consideration for the Appeal Court of Madrid (Section 32) in the appeal case. 2. Discussion and legal context 2.1 Legal framework: contested regulation The Judgement defines the relevant market as the organisation and marketing of international football club competitions at the European level. Among the aforementioned declaratory actions, the one alleging the incompatibility of the defendants’ internal rules with articles 101 and 102 stands out. Specifically, it refers to articles 22, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, and 73 of the FIFA Statutes, article 6[mfn]‘1. International Matches may only be authorised by FIFA, a Confederation or a Member in accordance with these regulations.2. All International Matches must be authorised by the Members to which the participating teams belong and by the Member on whose territory the match is to be played…’.[/mfn] of the FIFA Regulations Governing International Matches, and articles 49[mfn]‘1. UEFA shall have the sole jurisdiction to organise or abolish international competitions in Europe in which Member Associations and/or their clubs participate. FIFA competitions shall not be affected by this provision. […]3. International matches, competitions or tournaments which are not organised by UEFA but are played on UEFA’s territory shall require the prior approval of FIFA and/or UEFA and/or the relevant Member Associations in accordance with the FIFA Regulations Governing International Matches and any additional implementing rules adopted by the UEFA Executive Committee’.[/mfn] and 51[mfn]‘No combinations or alliances between … clubs affiliated, directly or indirectly, to different UEFA Member Associations may be formed without the permission of UEFA’.[/mfn] of the UEFA Statutes. 2.2 Prior authorization and ‘dual nature’ of the Defendants The Judgement does not focus on the fact that FIFA and UEFA hold a monopoly in the market for the authorization and organization of international competitions, which is indisputable evidence. Rather, it highlights the absence of a regulated, controlled, and standardized authorization procedure that leads to
Minimum Damages under EU Law in Antitrust Damages Actions? Conclusions from the Recent Case Law of the German Supreme Court
The estimated damage cannot be less than 5% of the purchase price paid for reasons of effectiveness under EU law.” This was recently stated by the German Federal Court of Justice about claims for damages due to the Dieselgate scandal. However, the Court’s reasoning in favour of this legal lower limit for damages might equally, if not even more so, be applied to cartel damages claims – an analysis.